ANDY WONG/AP

Hu Jintao delivers the keynote address at a ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of China’s "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on December 31.

CHINESE President Hu Jintao’s new initiative towards non-sovereign Taiwan is designed to herald uncharted possibilities. No less importantly, Hu timed his New-Year-eve move for the inauguration of Barack Obama as the “new-age” President of the United States.

A broad but nuanced agenda of Taiwan’s peaceful unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) constitutes the nucleus of this political initiative. And, in historical terms, such unification with the PRC is actually seen as reunification with China as a political power that has been flourishing since ancient times.

Taiwan really belongs to the PRC under the internationally recognised “One-China principle”. Yet, the U.S. has continuously played a decisive role in sustaining its somewhat distinctive identity despite its existential status as, at best, a non-state actor on the international stage. Surely, the status, as reflected in Taiwan’s membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum under the name of “Taipei, China”, carries no stigma like that of “non-state actors” in the arena of terrorism. And, Taipei is no more than the functional “capital” of Taiwan, earlier known as the “Republic of China” until its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971. On balance, however, there are limits to Taiwan’s elbow room even as an APEC participant. It is simply a functioning economic entity with no attributes of sovereign statehood.

Keeping in mind these ground realities and looking to the future, Hu has spelt out his six-point initiative. Availing himself of the opportunity offered by the 30th anniversary of the PRC’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, Hu covered the entire gamut of political, economic, military and socio-cultural dimensions of the PRC-Taiwan equation as it stands today.

On the overarching political dimension, Hu said: “Under a common understanding of ‘One China’, anything can be talked about between the two sides. Anything that is conducive to peaceful development across the Straits, we will greatly promote. Anything that harms it [such development], we will firmly oppose.” In the political discourse on the “Taiwan question” in East Asia, as acceptable to Beijing, the terminology of “two sides” not only denotes Beijing and Taipei but also subsumes the reality of a non-sovereign status for Taiwan. For Beijing, the phraseologies of “cross-Straits relations” and “across the Straits” refer to the waterway between “the two sides” as the geographical reality and not as any divisive geopolitical scenario as such.

Within the overall political framework of “One China”, Hu suggested, Beijing would be willing to discuss with Taipei “proper and reasonable arrangements” for its participation in international organisations and activities. While Taipei’s participation in the APEC forum had already set a clear benchmark, the redline would be that any such participation should be so devised as to prevent the creation of scenarios such as “two Chinas” or “China and Taiwan” in any kind of real or purported terms of sovereignty. The circumstances of 1949, which marked the birth of the PRC and the gradual evolution of the current situation in Taiwan, should always be seen in the context of the “One China” vision and reality, Hu emphasised.

Flowing from the “One China” spirit, the “two sides” should, in his second proposition, “stop confrontation and reach peaceful agreements”. Political talks could be stepped up in such a climate. Taking shape, as a logical corollary, is the third dimension of the need to increase military contacts and exchanges so as to “ease cross-Straits tensions”. This would lead to a reduction of worries about security issues with a military focus.

The fourth aspect of the Hu initiative pertains to the economic realm, where the “two sides” have already engaged each other considerably in a manner that benefits both. Now envisioned in this context is the possibility of talks about “a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement”. The objective would be the establishment of “a mechanism for collaboration with special cross-Straits characteristics” – a pan-China ambience of spirit and substance.

PICHI CHUANG /REUTERS

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou attends a flag-hoisting ceremony in front of the presidential office in Taipei on January 1.

Sending out a firm warning to the “pro-independence elements” in Taiwan, Hu outlined the fifth aspect of his initiative as follows: “If the [Democratic Progressive] Party [now in the Opposition] could abandon its ‘Taiwan independence’ stance, we would make a positive response to them.” And the last but not the least of the six proposals was an invitation to all residents of Taiwan to “promote China’s traditional civilisation with strengthened spiritual ties”.

Sheng Lijun, a long-time Chinese specialist on the “Taiwan question”, told Frontline that the initiative opened, “for the first time”, the genuine possibility of a “win-win game” in the process of Taiwan’s “eventual unification” with the PRC. “Hu’s initiative can for the first time [help] end the hostility status between the two sides [through] confidence-building measures. Since 1949, the military-hostility status has not ended, technically,” he said.

Within this broad spectrum of possibilities, Hu’s initiative will, in practical terms, help the PRC to “build an environment inside Taiwan conducive to eventual unification”. In Sheng’s view, the PRC’s objective is to create “an irreversible political momentum inside Taiwan … [so as to] reduce the likelihood of war and military confrontation [between the two sides]”.

He emphasises that Hu’s initiative has been made possible by the recent election of Ma Ying-jeou of Kuomintang (KMT) as the “President” of Taiwan. A popular and handsome politician with a winning smile, Ma is seen in Beijing as a potentially serious interlocutor for launching the process of unification. Sheng reckons that he is not alone among Chinese experts on the “Taiwan question” in doing so, and hence “the one who loses” now will be the “independence”-seeking outfit in that territory.

Within the local theatre of “cross-Straits relations”, the PRC’s new offer, especially its military-related confidence-building dimension, is viewed by Asia-Pacific diplomats and analysts in the context of Taiwan’s recent “military exercise”. Sheng and others with his line of thinking are convinced, however, that the “exercise does not mean much” as a factor at all in Hu’s calculations. Although it was indeed “a regular exercise”, Ma actually “cut down its scale”. More importantly, the Taiwan leader did also emphasise that he was “not looking for any confrontation” with Beijing.

Speaking after Hu unveiled his initiative, Ma narrated how his “administration” had, from mid-December 2008, “smoothly commenced direct air, sea and postal services” between Taiwan and the PRC. His poll-time pledges in March 2008 included the ideas of a “common market” and a “peace treaty” involving the “two sides”. And, his political punchline now is that “Taiwan has [under his rule] become a peacemaker and a responsible stakeholder in the [East Asian] region”.

At the time of writing this report, Hu’s initiative has not come in for studied comments by Western governments and opinion-makers. However, some experts, such as Bates Gill and others, while noticing signs of a “power shift” in global politics a few years ago, saw China as an increasingly confident power in dealing with Asian affairs. Some others, such as Jonathan Pollack, felt that China might seek to “limit its exposure in America’s strategic headlights”. From Beijing’s perspective, though, Hu’s new initiative, outlined ahead of Obama’s assumption of office, is certainly timed to a nicety.