INDIA & PAKISTAN

Softening stances

B. MURALIDHAR REDDY
in Islamabad

Pakistan's Id-eve proposals including a ceasefire and other bilateral measures, which can lead to meaningful negotiations, have apparently resulted from internal and external pressures.

PRESS INFORMATION DEPARTMENT/HO/AFP

President Pervez Musharraf with Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali (right) in Islamabad on November 21.

PAKISTAN Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali surprised political and diplomatic observers by his dramatic announcement on November 23, in the course of a televised address to the nation, of a unilateral ceasefire by Pakistani forces along the Line of Control (LoC). The address coincided with the first anniversary of his government.

The unilateral ceasefire was the first such gesture from the Pakistani side. But a perceivably `weak' civilian set-up as the present one in the country could not have contemplated such a step on its own. The real player had to be the all-powerful President, General Pervez Musharraf, and the Army under his command. Jamali could only have been merely articulating a policy decision taken by Musharraf in consultation with his coterie.

This suspicion was further strengthened when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee disclosed in the course of his Assembly election tour that it required a great deal of persuasion to convince Pakistan to agree to the ceasefire. Vajpayee seemed to hint that the idea was born outside Pakistan and that a `third party' was involved in the backdoor diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi.

That it was all perhaps a coordinated exercise was further evident when New Delhi quickly welcomed the ceasefire initiative and proposed extending it to the Siachen glacier. In double quick time, that is, in less than two hours, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri announced that it covered Siachen too. The next day the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan agreed, in the course of their weekly telephonic contact, to enforce the ceasefire with effect from the midnight of November 26. These things do not happen just like that, and not certainly in the case of India and Pakistan.

Knowledgeable circles in Islamabad confirm a great deal of behind-the-scenes activity in the two capitals preceding the ceasefire declaration. All indications are that neither the civilian set-up headed by Jamali nor the Pakistani Foreign Office was in the know. It appears that very few in India and Pakistan were privy to the events leading to the announcement, and in Pakistan it was the military top brass that made it possible.

WHAT made Pakistan reverse its earlier position on a ceasefire as well as some of the politically significant confidence-building measures (CBMs) unveiled by India on October 22? After all three weeks before Jamali's anniversary speech, Pakistan Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokkar had insisted on United Nations (U.N.) travel documents for passengers from either side of the divide for the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service to be feasible.

Khokkar had termed the CBMs proposed by India as `non-issues' and emphasised the need for immediate resumption of composite dialogue on all issues pending between the two sides. "Come to the table and we would discuss everything together", was his curt response to the Indian ideas on a resumption of communication links between Sindh and Rajasthan and a ferry service between Karachi and Mumbai.

Perhaps part of the answer to Pakistan's new-found enthusiasm lies in the overwhelming desire of the Pakistani establishment to host a successful South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. Islamabad is to be the venue for the SAARC summit, slated to be held from January 4 to 6 next year. If New Delhi decides to play spoilsport, Islamabad cannot even host the summit, leave alone make it a success.

RAFIQ MAQBOOL/AP

At Uri, about 100 km north of Srinagar, a road sign showing the distance to Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. A highlight of A.B. Vajpayee's Deepavali proposals made to Pakistan was a bus service linking the two cities.

Pakistan has waited far too long to let the opportunity slip. Originally scheduled for January this year Islamabad had little option but to postpone the summit indefinitely in the face of cold vibes from New Delhi. There have been many appeals in recent weeks to Vajpayee, from several functionaries in the Pakistani establishment, to travel to Islamabad. The mending of fences with New Delhi is meant to enhance Islamabad's appeal value as a host.

At least some observers here tend to believe that SAARC would provide the much-needed opportunity for Pakistan to break out of its `isolation' and don the leadership mantle in the region. With the country's eastern and western borders turning hot simultaneously and world attention riveted on how the Pakistani establishment tackles `Islamic fundamentalism', SAARC would be a welcome relief for Islamabad.

The establishment has to show to the people what Pakistan has gained in return for all that is done to take on the militias and the jehadis. There is a growing perception in the country that the leadership is reversing policies and acting at the behest of the West for peanuts in return, particularly after the U-turn on Afghan policy in the wake of 9/11. This is where dialogue or movement towards dialogue with India is crucial.

In the calculation of Pakistan, a successful SAARC summit can help break the stalemate with India and set in motion a process towards a revival of talks. A bilateral meeting between Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf on the sidelines of the SAARC summit is ideal scenario for Pakistan. But Islamabad is fully conscious of the fact that as things stand, it would be asking for too much. Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has already ruled out such a possibility and reiterated the bottom-to-top approach of India in dealing with Pakistan. So the next best thing is warm handshakes, hugs and sweet-nothings symbolism.

Against this backdrop, the latest ceasefire move itself was completely different from the ceasefire proposal mooted by Pakistan twice since August. Musharraf first suggested the idea when a group of Indian parliamentarians and journalists was in Islamabad in August and repeated it in the U.N. General Assembly in September. The proposal made by Musharraf was conditional, and was subject to acceptance by India. He also sought to link it to a `ceasefire' by India in the valley. New Delhi rejected it as a non-starter on the grounds that it cannot let down its guard on the LoC when there is no let-up in infiltration by terrorists.

Another factor that could have played a role in the ceasefire initiative and the reversal of its position on earlier CBMs is the reaction within and without. The reaction of Pakistan to the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service in particular was perceived in most of the world capitals as Islamabad's attempt to pour cold water on an imaginative move. If reports in a section of the Pakistani press are any guide, the subject figured at the closed-door meetings of top envoys of Pakistan here on the day Jamali addressed the nation. Most of them were of the view that Islamabad should not seen as blocking any move to improve people-to-people contact.

Pakistan's insistence that checkposts between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar should be manned by U.N. personnel and that people could travel only with U.N. documents has not gone down well with Kashmiris on both sides. After all, they have been pleading with the Indian and Pakistani governments for five and a half decades to facilitate easy movement of people and allow at some stage some kind of intra-Kashmiri dialogue. So Pakistan's reaction was virtually seen as its effort to virtually scuttle the bus service.

It was the same story on the Indian proposal for the re-opening of Khokhrapar-Monabao (Rajasthan-Sindh) route, which has remained closed since the 1965 war. When India mooted the proposal in October, Pakistan said that it could be discussed only as part of the composite dialogue. Jamali has now announced that Pakistan is ready to talk with India and has even offered to host talks on both the bus service and the reopening of the Khokhrapar-Monabao route besides several other conciliatory moves he has mooted.

People in the Sindh province have not appreciated the bureaucratic response of Pakistan on the Monabao link. After all 90 per cent of the visa-seekers to India hail from the province and it is a torture for the people to go through the tedious procedures involved. The people are keen on a revival of communication links with Rajasthan, as it would cut down their costs of travelling to India.

So Jamali chose to revive the idea of visa camps in different cities of India and Pakistan to facilitate the issuance of visas. Without raising the earlier point on the need for restoration of original strength of the High Commissions, the Pakistan Prime Minister proposed that both Pakistani and Indian High Commissions, after mutual agreement, should look into the possibilities of opening visa camps.

He made it a point to mention that Pakistan was in favour of a resumption of air links between the two countries and that negotiations between the two civil aviation authorities scheduled for December 1 and 2 were extremely important. Jamali hoped that these negotiations would lead to the revival of air links between Lahore and Delhi, Karachi and Mumbai, and Karachi and Delhi; he did not refer to the earlier insistence of Islamabad on guarantees from India against a unilateral suspension of overflight facilities.

Jamali also re-floated Pakistan's proposal to revive the Amritsar-Lahore Samjhauta Express train service. "We think that a decision in this regard should be reached by the end of this year," he said. India had linked it to the revival of air services and that was resented by Pakistan. He also proposed that the Interior Ministries of Pakistan and India should find ways to resolve the problems of prisoners jailed in each other's countries, especially those who have served their terms but could not be sent back to their countries.

Jamali's first anniversary speech and the proposals to improve ties with India were preceded by a symbolic but significant step by Islamabad in addressing the concerns of India on cross-border infiltration and the terrorism infrastructure. New Delhi has been seeking an end to infiltration and the dismantling of the terror infrastructure as a pre-requisite for dialogue. Days before Jamali's address, Pakistan banned six offshoots of banned militant and sectarian outfits. These included two branches of the Jaish-e-Mohammad. An organisation headed by Hafeez Sayeed, the former chief of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Toiba, has been put on the `watch list'. The two organisations are the most active among the foreign militant outfits operating in the Kashmir valley. Of course, it amounted to an admission of failure to crack down on banned militant outfits, but Pakistan mustered the courage to advertise it when it reiterated its resolve to take on the jehadis.

Pakistan had been through this road before, when it claimed to have cracked the whip against the jehadis after the much-publicised January 12, 2002 speech of Gen. Musharraf. Five militant and sectarian outfits were banned and nearly 2,000 activists of these organisations were detained in a nationwide swoop. But within months the government was forced to release them as it chose not to file any formal charges against them.

Would it be any different this time? Only time will tell. However, there is no mistaking the signals from the Pakistani establishment. They are aimed at conveying a message particularly to New Delhi and creating an ambience before the SAARC summit. The idea is to bring India to the negotiating table. Would New Delhi respond?

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