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Volume 18 - Issue 09, Apr. 28 - May 11, 2001 India's National Magazine from the publishers of THE HINDU |
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THE STATES
The Pant mission
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Before: September 26 to November 27, 2000 Phase I: November 28 to December 27, 2000 Phase II: December 28, 2000 to January 26, 2001 Phase III: January 27 to February 26, 2001 Phase IV: February 27 to March 20, 2001 |
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Source: The Institute of Conflict Management, New Delhi |
Unsurprisingly, the APHC is not biting. Speaking to reporters in Islamabad on April 18, APHC executive member Sheikh Abdul Aziz bluntly said that "attempts by New Delhi to set into motion a peace process without entering into meaningful talks with the Kashmiri leadership and Pakistan are useless". Aziz, one of the six-to-one majority on the APHC executive opposed to Geelani, is in Pakistan on a personal visit. His statement is, however, being vested with significance, for he had been nominated to lead an APHC delegation to Pakistan, a visit many in the organisation believe must be a precondition to talks. Aziz' dismissive remarks had been anticipated, three days earlier, by the APHC chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat. Bhat, without saying whether he was speaking for himself or the APHC, asserted that no dialogue was possible without a delegation first being allowed to visit Pakistan.
Bhat's calls of alarm point to the reasons for growing apprehension among the APHC's moderate majority. During his press conference, the APHC chairman claimed that the Union government's actions were placing the moderates "in a precarious position". This, he said, was because Indian officials cared only for their "welfare, without being concerned about our safety". Put simply, Bhat believes that participation in dialogue without the involvement of Pakistan would invite terrorist reprisals. Major organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizbul Mujahideen have rejected calls for talks, and threatened those who engage in them with elimination. Some APHC leaders like Lone, however, believe that rejecting dialogue with Pant would enable India to represent the organisation as an unreasonable one. This position, however, is countered by the claim that participation would only lead to the APHC moderates being seen by their constituencies as traitors to the cause.
Many of these arguments figured in the inconclusive APHC meeting held on April 17, and have been referred to the organisation's working committee and general council. The working committee has 35 members, five from each party represented in the executive, and the general council has another 32, one from each constituent. Pro-Pakistan organisations, among whom Geelani has considerable influence, make up the majority on the general council. The APHC moderates have sought, without success, to make the Jamaat-e-Islami withdraw Geelani from the executive. Since January they have not sent invitations for executive meetings to the Jamaat leader.
It is hard to predict just how the power struggle within the APHC will play itself out, but the signs during these past weeks have not been encouraging. The Islamic Far Right has succeeded in generating more than a little support, particularly among the urban middle and lower middle class. Rights violations by the Indian security forces have had some role in propelling recent mobilisations of the Right, but larger forces have also been at work. Much ultra -Right protest, including demonstrations in support of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, have been driven by a growing climate of anti-Muslim violence in some parts of India. Mob violence in several areas of Jammu and Kashmir in March was, for example, the outcome of communal outrages in Punjab and New Delhi. Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh aggression in Jammu region has fuelled Muslim anxieties in both that area and Kashmir. In such a fraught environment, the room for manoeuvre for APHC centrists is increasingly limited.
MANY observers believe that guns, not the Pant dialogue, will shape events this summer. Building on the operational mandate in the April 4 communique, sources say that the security forces have been instructed to launch increasingly wide-area operations. Through the earlier phases of the Ramzan ceasefire, operations were largely restricted to engagements of chance, or those based on information about the presence of terrorists in specific built-up areas. Much of the renewed fighting has come in the border districts of Jammu province, where troops and police personnel have renewed aggressive search operations in forest areas. Seven terrorists were killed in Kathua on August 17, for example, and another eight were eliminated in Rajouri and Poonch six days earlier. The valley, relatively quiet since protests against alleged security force atrocities began in January, has also seen an increasing number of encounters.
The renewed armed conflict is not a particularly surprising phenomenon. Analysts had for months been warning that the ratio of security force losses to those of terrorist groups had become unacceptably high. The police, the paramilitary forces and the Army were among them losing almost one trooper for each terrorist eliminated, the worst ratio since the outbreak of violence in the State. Although, as officials pointed out, overall numbers of security force casualties declined, killings of terrorist cadre fell even more steeply. With the mountain passes leading from Pakistan now open after the winter, and with no signs of infiltration levels declining in any significant way, there was intense pressure on the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to allow a de facto resumption of offensive operations. Although a ceasefire is still in force, it is significant that the April 4 communique makes no demand that the security forces refrain from initiating combat operations in Jammu and Kashmir.
Pant's dialogue in Jammu and Kashmir, then, is certain to be punctuated by violence. Just how meaningful such a dialogue will be remains to be seen. Abdullah has been among the few leaders in the State to react positively to the Union government's announcement. At a recent meeting the Chief Minister promised to put forward proposals for a "final resolution" of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. These, he said, would remain "secret, so as to enable free discussion". It is possible that the N.C. will use the Pant dialogue to push its demands for regional autonomy, and for the internal re-division of Jammu & Kashmir along its ethnic-communal lines. So far there are no signs that anti-autonomy groupings, like Hindu chauvinist groups in Jammu, will join in the dialogue. State Congress(I) leaders have expressed their willingness to participate in a dialogue, but expressed caution about negotiating with the APHC.
Much will, of course, depend on just how serious the Union government is about creating some meaningful political space in the matter of the dialogue. It has been lost on no one that Pant has little real authority, and, perhaps, was chosen for that very reason. That the Ramzan ceasefire created friction between Union Home Minister L.K. Advani and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh on the one hand, and the PMO on the other, is no secret. Pant will doubtless spend the next several months listening to voices from across Jammu and Kashmir. Whether this will constitute a dialogue, or just remain a cacophonic exercise, remains to be seen.